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Педагогическая философия Толстого: выявление воспитательного насилия

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Толстой занимал антифундаментальную позицию по многим философским вопросам. Он выступал за творческий, свободный образовательный процесс. Толстой помогает оценить этический элемент в антифундаментальной педагогической философии. Для Толстого этот элемент выступает в качестве границы между антифундаментализмом и теорией в образовании, между «know how» и «know what». Однако данность мира требует определённого уровня насилия в любом общении ребёнка и педагога. Необходимость встречи с миром неизбежно должна быть навязана. Это порождает очень тонкую косвенную форму насилия, которую можно было бы назвать воспитательным насилием. Воспитательное насилие — главный враг творческого начала в толстовской философии образования, в образовании в целом и одновременно важный инструмент, который следует учитывать.

Ключевые слова: воспитательное насилие, Толстой, экзистенциальная педагогика, школьная травля, know how, антифундаментализм.

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Tolstoy's pedagogical philosophy: identifying educational violence

Tolstoy hold an anti-foundationalist position on many philosophical questions. He advocated a creative free educational process. Tolstoy helps to evaluate the ethical element in anti-foundationalist educational philosophy. For Tolstoy this element acts as a borderline between anti-foundationalism and theory in education, between “know how” and “know what.” However, the givenness of the world necessitates some level of violence in any communication between a child and an educator. The necessity meeting the world is not up to child to decide. This generates a very subtle indirect form of violence, which could be called educational violence. The educational violence is the main enemy of the creative element in Tolstoyan education, education in general

and also an important tool, which should be considered.

Keywords: *educational violence, Tolstoy, existential pedagogy, bullying, know how, anti-foundationalism.*

I Tolstoy as a philosopher of education

Gertrude Anscombe, probably the most famous student of Wittgenstein, criticized Tolstoy's philosophy as a set of "miserable failures" [Anscombe, 1959: 170]. As it was shown earlier, this influential view contradicts deep philosophical parallels and evident influence of the Tolstoyan thought on Wittgenstein, in particular in regard of education. Still a lot of scholars see Tolstoy as being very religious, and therefore perceive his influence as being religious. Thus, Brian McGuinness interprets Tolstoy's perception of God when he says that according to Tolstoy, there is a world spirit [McGuinness, 1988: 221]. However, Tolstoy saw God only as reason, non-religiously, as was shown earlier.

McGuinness' view, and other similar views, could originate from a superficial reading of Tolstoy. Already when Tolstoy was only planning his Gospel, he wrote that he wants to write a story of a life of "Christ the materialist," to give a "materialist Gospel" [Biriukov, 1921: 436]. The final text of Tolstoy's Gospel is true to this intention. For example, according to Tolstoy, it is wrong to translate John 1:1 as "the Word (logos) was God." Tolstoy translated "logos" as "understanding of life" ("разумение жизни" "*razumenie zhizni*" [Tolstoy, 1957b: 816]), and therefore, "God" in John's Gospel is merely the understanding of life.

Here it is necessary to repeat the description of the often-overlooked anti-foundationalist stance taken by Tolstoy, his "anti-theory," to use Archambault's terms [Archambault, 1969: vi–xvii]. Tolstoy formulated a set of "unanswerable questions". "What is the meaning of life?" [Tolstoy, 1957a: 43] and "what is beauty?" [Tolstoy, 1904: 15] and even "what is education" [Tolstoy, 1989c: 24] are such questions. According to Tolstoy, it is impossible to say what the meaning of life is, and one shall just live in a way, such that the question will never arise [Tolstoy, 1957a: 43]. Tolstoy holds analogous position regarding all the other "unanswerable questions."

Tolstoy wanted to minimize the generalizations and ready conclusions given to children, as well as to avoid all forms of compulsion. Thus, he believes that the teacher must not teach children not to kill. Instead, the teacher's duty is to present an ethical matter in such a form that children themselves would provide such a generalization [Tolstoy, 1989b: 37].

Now it is necessary to consider the pair of "education" ("воспитание" "*vospitanie*") and "teaching" in the Tolstoyan philosophy of education. Tolstoy elaborated a difference between "education" ("воспитание" "*vospitanie*") and "teaching" ("преподавание" "*prepodavanie*"). According to Tolstoy, education has an unavoidable element of violence, while teaching does not have such an element [Tolstoy, 1989a: 207–208].

According to Tolstoy, education cannot be justified, except, probably, for religious education. In his view on a religious education as acceptable, Tolstoy shows

his complex attitude towards religion: Tolstoy had a deep respect for folk religiosity combined with the rejection of both the existence of god (in any other form than a metaphor) and of official religion. The former comes from Tolstoy's ideal of simplicity: a religious peasant is an example of an integral personality for Tolstoy. Later Tolstoy explicitly denies moral integrity of dogmatic religious education [Veikshan, 1953: 116].

II The educational violence

First of all, it is necessary to mention, that the problem of a special kind of violence, which is called here the educational violence, is not limited, according to Tolstoy, to physical violence towards the students. The physical punishments in educational philosophy at the end of the 19th century are, in fact, only an archaic practice excluded from any progressive educational theory. Moreover, Tolstoy severely criticized physical punishments using Eastern concepts, such as *wuwei* and *ahimsa*.

The educational violence, discovered by Tolstoy's pedagogical efforts, consists of the fact that a child cannot determine what to study. The necessity of education is also not up to him to decide. Tolstoy himself probably never used the term "educational violence," but he obviously built his educational philosophy to avoid something which can be named by this term. Moreover, in a polemical exchange between Evgeniy L. Markov and Tolstoy, Markov used the term "pedagogical violence," [Markov, 1862: 151] although without specifying what he meant by it. Actually, despite a common belief that Tolstoy's educational philosophy was ignored [Biriukov, 1921: 494], a belief supported by Tolstoy himself, Markov evaluated Tolstoy negatively, yet deeply. This evaluation was published in *The Russian Herald (Russkiy Vestnik)* in 1862. It is not much, but the content of this response can clarify what exactly was happening during Tolstoy's educational experiment and how educational violence was viewed by Tolstoy's contemporaries.

Markov criticized the philosophy of education by Tolstoy from the viewpoint of a practical necessity in education. Markov also criticized the lack of references and academic sources in Tolstoy's work. However, Markov expressed conservative views which were common in the 19th century Russia, but not so acceptable today. In particular, Markov expressed a strong conviction that the aristocracy should define education because it is the best part of society, and because the aristocracy knows better [Markov, 1862: 157].

But the main idea of Markov's criticism is that even if a Tolstoyan approach is possible, it is not realizable because it demands too much from a teacher. It is impossible to assign count Tolstoy to every school. Another important argument by Markov was a contradiction between theory and practice in Tolstoy pedagogy; in particular, Markov believed that Tolstoy must apply some "pedagogical violence" in his school which would not be so excellent otherwise. Biriukov, a biographer and a follower of Tolstoy, was trying to deny the presence of such a contradiction [Biriukov, 1921: 495]. However, if we take a look in Tolstoy's diaries during his pedagogical practice, which Biriukov used, it is obvious how hard it was for Tolstoy to avoid such a contradiction: Tolstoy was creating more and more liberal ways to punish children [Veikshan, 1953: 96-97], he was trying new ways to approach different subject matters

[Biriukov, 1921: 519-525]. In fact, Tolstoy's school was a quest for ideal education free from educational violence, rather than the ideal educational institution. This constitutes the paradox Markov saw between Tolstoy's educational essays and Tolstoy's educational practice.

Tolstoy's school was surely the pedagogical laboratory Tolstoy wanted it to be, but it was a very demanding laboratory. After a year, Tolstoy had to take a long vacation to improve his health by drinking horse milk in the steppes as it was fashionable at that time [Biriukov, 1921: 526]. Not every teacher could afford this. Tolstoy, after all, was rich and his demand and criticism of other Russian teachers in the village schools was unfair in the way marked by Markov [Markov, 1862: 177]: not everyone can put forth the effort to teach as count Tolstoy did. This is so because of two reasons: first, not everyone is a count; and second, not everyone is Tolstoy. In fact, it shows a side of educational violence unknown to Tolstoy, the violence of the educational process targeting at the educator rather than the students.

Markov stressed that Tolstoy's position in his community was absolutely different from the position of ordinary school teacher in the village. Such a teacher was viewed by commoners as a servant to whom the commoners pay. On the other hand, Tolstoy was a very rich man with a lot of connections, with a background of an important local bureaucrat. Tolstoy served as a *mirovoy posrednik*, a mediator between former serfs and former serf-owners after the abolition of serfdom. As a *mirovoy posrednik* Tolstoy did a lot for the peasants and was loved for what he did [Biriukov, 1921: 474]. Because of Tolstoy's social status, as Markov explicitly said, some children could be conditioned privately by parents to behave in Tolstoy's school, a possibility which could considerably water down the success Tolstoy had claimed.

Moreover, it is important to mention that Tolstoy could impose in his school in Yasnaya Polyana ("Clear Meadow") uniquely liberal demands: Tolstoy was able to allow some children to be passively present in class for a considerable amount of time to overcome shyness. In a situation of systematic education, something like this will jam the school: such children will be too far behind others of the same age to successfully move from class to class. Tolstoy could easily avoid this problem because his school did not organize the pupils according to their level of knowledge. All children studied in Tolstoy's school as one big group, even some adult peasants took part in the classes [Biriukov, 1921: 49]. Tolstoy stopped running his school quite early. He had to make a vocation to improve his health after two years of teaching. If Tolstoy did not leave his school as early as he did, he probably would have to reorganize the children this way and, quite possibly, need a strategy to push children who are too shy to speak in class as well.

Tolstoy also demanded that children make decisions about the school program and school administration system almost to the level of "self-government." Markov expressed quite a reasonable doubt about this "self-government of children" [Markov, 1862: 183]. For Tolstoy, this demand was particularly important because of his developing conceptions of anarchism as a social ideal. In extreme cases, like fights between pupils, Tolstoy still thought teachers should not intervene. Tolstoy even believed that fights between children should go unpunished and will be corrected by

children better than by a teacher [Veikshan, 1953: 94-95].

In the end Markov gave a Tolstoyan project more ambivalent judgment than he thought he did: Markov wrote that if all ideas of Tolstoy were realized, it would lead to chaos, and after chaos, there would be a return of “almost the same state of affairs in a school in Tula as it already is” [Markov, 1862: 185]. But this “almost” could make a big difference. Even the paradoxical idea that children themselves should manage bullying in class to some degree finds justification in the fact that punishments do not change much regarding this problem. Moreover, relying on the pupils’ opinion in class to settle conflicts between the children could probably do more (especially, as Tolstoy mentioned, because the teacher knows much less than a classmate and a teacher can also make a mistake) [Veikshan, 1953: 95].

Markov praised Tolstoy’s school as a “pedagogical laboratory,” but dismissed Tolstoy’s radical criticism of all precedent pedagogical theory. Markov also rejected radicalism of some of Tolstoy’s ideas. But at the same time, Markov believed that something positive was achieved by Tolstoy, but unfortunately, he did not try to spell out what exactly. Moreover, Tolstoy’s response, where much more radical ideas were present, did even more to limit the success of Tolstoy’s pedagogical Odyssey in Russian society. Tolstoy replied with the article ‘Progress and the definition of education’ where he explicitly denies the existence of progress, which for him was a superstition shared by a minority, while “China, with 200 million of citizens, refute our idea of progress” [Tolstoy, 1989e: 333]. According to Tolstoy, the belief in progress has led Markov to his view on education, which was fundamentally wrong to Tolstoy. The Chinese are much more interested in developing the industry now than they were when Tolstoy expressed this paradoxical claim, even if by claiming this Tolstoy showed a remarkable level of freedom from eurocentrism. However, if we try to see Tolstoy’s idea of progress as a moral matter, it can be much more acceptable. The same holds for Nestroy’s idea of progress, “that it always looks much greater than it really is,” used as an epigraph by Wittgenstein for *Philosophical Investigations*.

III Tolstoy as pedagogue and violence

The idea of creative education, where every class is unique, has both ethical and aesthetical complications. To Tolstoy the inequality of ethical and aesthetical is fundamental, ethical is absolute and aesthetical is much less important. In this Tolstoy is close to Kant, whom Tolstoy admired. Tolstoy’s creative accomplishments need no mentioning, and his attitude to teaching is quite close to his creative method. The ideal Tolstoy postulates is of excited children exploring the forest, which he contrasted with an unacceptable picture of static bored pupils in a school.

Tolstoy’s school in Yasnaya Polyana, and his essays on education are often understood as an example of existential pedagogy [Moulin and Bailey, 2014: 47]. And if so, it was probably the first such example. Moreover, Tolstoy directly influenced Martin Heidegger, who quoted *The Death of Ivan Ilyich* in the 51st section of *Being and Time*. So that besides antitheoretical pedagogy, Tolstoy deeply influenced existentialism in general and existential strain in contemporary pedagogical thought in particular, as well as creative pedagogy, many Soviet educational experiments, and even the Montessori movement in Russia through Tolstoy’s daughter, Tatyana

Sukhotin-Tolstoy, and her book *Three Journeys to Rome to Maria Montessori*. Tolstoy's school was indeed meant to be a place to prepare the children for the life ahead. Peter Roberts and Herner Saeverot described Tolstoy's view on pedagogy as a way to move from non-authentic condition to the authentic one in Heideggerian fashion. In doing this, Roberts and Saeverot are following Heidegger himself [Roberts and Saeverot, 2017: 47]. But the grounds for this can be found also in Tolstoy's ideas related to education. Thus, Tolstoy explicitly pointed out the necessity to free "the school" from "the history" [Biriukov, 1921: 494] where both categories can be understood in roughly existential fashion. "The history", for Tolstoy, keeps the school from being what it should be, it torments children doing unnecessary, boring, outdated things instead of letting the children explore the real world, in a way symbolized to Tolstoy in an image of children walking in a forest: exited and curious.

Tolstoy made a deep emphasis on the ethical and aesthetical aspects of education. For example, Tolstoy's diary keeps a record on how he gave a class based on a special task – to write a story based on an old Russian proverb against hypocrisy. The proverb can roughly be translated in English as "the man is feeding the other man with a spoon while poking the other man's eye with the spoon's handle" [Tolstoy, 1989d: 302] The proverb means that when someone helps someone else in a very unpleasant way, this help is not morally integral. Tolstoy himself was writing with children during that class and believed that he did a poor job in comparison with others. Tolstoy was also an advocate of a highly individualized approach – thus, one girl was too shy to speak, and Tolstoy decided to leave her be, and in the end it became fruitful and the girl started participating in the class [Veikshan, 1953: 99]. In his diaries Tolstoy left rich portraits of his students. They were together not only in the building of the school but were also walking outdoors after the classes. Even critics of Tolstoyan pedagogy were admirers of Tolstoy's school, as it is true to Markov [Markov, 1862: 176] in the discussion above, and to Herzen who viewed Tolstoy's philosophy as unclear and groundless [Biriukov, 1921: 448] while admiring Tolstoy's way of teaching the children [Veikshan, 1953].

Conclusion

The educational violence is an important concept born from the discussion around the Tolstoyan pedagogical experiment. It can be understood as the hard pre-given condition any educational practice has to be based on: the world. If Wittgenstein rejects Tolstoy's *Resurrection* because there Tolstoy narrates ethical matters rather than just showing these matters. But it is hard to see how one can go without some narrating (prescribing) of ethical concepts and not to fall into complete hopeless ethical relativism. The educational violence seems to be the only measure against solipsism and, eventually, ethical relativism. As Wenzel puts it, "the rules better be explicit." [Wenzel, 2013: 350] The philosophical status of the rule in the context of educational philosophy as such and in the Tolstoyan and the Wittgensteinian contexts in particular seems to be a related but separate problem. In this regard, it is crucial not to teach just "language games." The ethical education categorically needs something that transcends the language. It cannot be the mystical of early Wittgenstein, because the teacher needs a hope for the ethical being found and being expressed by the student. In the end it is a belief in a possibility of finding a rule free from Kripkean dangers.

Christian Wenzel believes that Wittgenstein's apophatic position on ethical theory "might be too self-centered" [Wenzel, 2013: 349]. Wenzel also provides a close view by Hilary Putnam, who also is not happy with Wittgenstein's "double standard" in judgment of different propositional systems: Wittgenstein distrusted metaphysics but trusted religion [Wenzel, 2013: 349]. Tolstoy would stand somewhere in the middle between these two sides, between Wittgenstein's anti-theoretical stance on one side and Wenzel and Putnam on another side. Tolstoy would not agree with the necessity of ethical or educational theories, but he demands an absolute reality and openness of particular ethical postulates at a fundamental level of human existence. Tolstoy saw such postulates in the world of popular religiosity and folklore. Tolstoy did not see much of cultural relativism there, he wanted all world religions and all "sages" saying the same thing with difference originating from unnecessarily over-complicated dogmatic creeds of organized religions. While elites view the world in different ways, popular view is homogeneous to Tolstoy. Unfortunately to him, contemporary cultural studies makes it difficult to defend this side of Tolstoy's philosophy. Thus, cultural worlds vary quite significantly.

Notes

1 Here and afterwards the quotations from Tolstoy are my own translations.

2 See, for example, his critique of art in "What is art", especially [Tolstoy, 1904: 42].

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Ценностные основания практик цифрового и технологического суверенитета ЕС

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Статья посвящена анализу ценностных оснований практик цифрового и технологического суверенитета ЕС. Концептуализированы понятия «научный суверенитет», «цифровой суверенитет», «технологический суверенитет». Определены различия в отечественных и европейских подходах к данным дефинициям. Систематизированы эффективные европейские практики, призванные обеспечить цифровой и технологический суверенитет ЕС. Сделан вывод, что практики технологического и цифрового суверенитета ЕС представляют собой не только инструменты обеспечения безопасности и